KAWASAKI Yujiro

写真a

Affiliation Department etc.

Department of Fundamental Study
Center for Research on Assistive Technology for Building a New Community

Title

Associate Professor

Graduating School

  • 2003.04
    -
    2007.03

    Kyoto University   Faculty of Science   Graduated

Graduate School

  • 2007.04
    -
    2013.03

    Kyoto University  Graduate School, Division of Economics  Doctor's Course  Completed

External Career

  • 2021.04
    -
    Now

    Nagoya Institute of Technology   Graduate School of Engineering   Associate Professor  

  • 2019.04
    -
    2021.03

      Associate Professor  

  • 2018.04
    -
    2019.03

    Kyoto Gakuen University   Associate Professor  

  • 2014.04
    -
    2018.03

    Kwansei Gakuin University   School of Business Administration   Assistant Professor  

  • 2013.04
    -
    2014.03

    Kyushu University   Researcher  

Academic Society Affiliations

  •  
     
     

    JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

Field of expertise (Grants-in-aid for Scientific Research classification)

  • Economic theory

 

Research Career

  • Analysis of matching under uncertain information: for broader application of mechanisms

    The Other Research Programs  

    Project Year:  2019.04  -  2022.03

  • Mathematical analysis and proposal on constrained matching formation problems

    The Other Research Programs  

    Project Year:  2014.04  -  2017.03

    We study distributional and informational constraints on matching formation. As for distributional constraint, we examine maximum and minimum quotas are imposed not only on individuals but also on regions and provide a new notion of second-best stable matching and a mechanism which always produce it because the well-known stable matching does not always exist in this case. As for informational constraints, we analyze the effect of information asymmetry in a decentralized matching market and propose a new type of matching mechanism that does not require each individual's full length of preference ordering over candidates.

  • Establishing Theory of Resource Allocation Mechanism Design for Sustainable Development

    The Other Research Programs  

    Project Year:  2012.05  -  2017.03

    How to allocate precious resources becomes critical due to various pressing social issues, including energy, environmental, and aging population issues. The goal of this project is developing the theory of resource allocation mechanism design, which aims to make desirable decisions considering economic, social, and environmental needs when multiple agents exist, by synthesizing/extending technologies from computer science and micro economics. More specifically, we developed design, analytic, and representation technologies for resource allocation. In particular, we made notable contributions on mechanism design for constrained two-sided matching, equilibrium analysis for repeated games in noisy environments, and concise and efficient representations for coalitional games. The summary of publications of this project is as follows: refereed international conferences 87, international journals 74, domestic journals 11, research monographs 8, textbooks 4, invited talks 40.

Thesis for a degree

  • Essays on Game Theoretic Analysis of Social Relationship

    川崎 雄二郎 

      2013.05  [Refereed]

    8   1

Papers

  • Myopic or farsighted: bilateral trade agreements among three symmetric countries

    Kawasaki, Yujiro, Tsubota, Kenmei

    LETTERS IN SPATIAL AND RESOURCE SCIENCES ( SPRINGER HEIDELBERG )    2019.12  [Refereed]

    Research paper (scientific journal)   Multiple Authorship

    We examine network formation through bilateral trade agreements (BTA) among three symmetric countries. Each government decides whether to form a link or not via a BTA depending on the differential of the ex-post and ex-ante sum of real wages in the country. Setting the governmental decision in two forms, myopic and farsighted, we analyze the resulting network formation. Firstly, we find that both myopic and farsighted games achieve complete networks. Secondly, networks resulting from myopic games coincide with those resulting from farsighted games.

  • On Reporting Preferences in Two-Sided Matching Problems : The Proposal of Mechanisms with Request Structure

    Yujiro Kawasaki

      64 ( 5 ) 245 - 279   2017.03

    Research paper (bulletin of university, research institution)   Multiple Authorship

  • Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas.

    Masahiro Goto, Atsushi Iwasaki, Yujiro Kawasaki, Ryoji Kurata, Yosuke Yasuda, Makoto Yokoo

    Artif. Intell.   235   40 - 57   2016  [Refereed]

    Research paper (scientific journal)   Multiple Authorship

  • Strategy-proof matching with regional minimum quotas.

    Masahiro Goto, Naoyuki Hashimoto, Atsushi Iwasaki, Yujiro Kawasaki, Suguru Ueda, Yosuke Yasuda, Makoto Yokoo

    International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, AAMAS '14, Paris, France, May 5-9, 2014 ( IFAAMAS/ACM )    1225 - 1232   2014  [Refereed]

    Research paper (international conference proceedings)   Multiple Authorship

  • Optimal false-name-proof single-item redistribution mechanisms.

    Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yujiro Kawasaki, Mingyu Guo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo

    International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, AAMAS '14, Paris, France, May 5-9, 2014 ( IFAAMAS/ACM )    221 - 228   2014  [Refereed]

    Research paper (international conference proceedings)   Multiple Authorship

  • One-to-many non-cooperative matching games.

    Yujiro Kawasaki

    Int. J. Game Theory   42 ( 2 ) 521 - 539   2013  [Refereed]

    Research paper (scientific journal)   Single Author

Presentations

  • Optimization method for ambulance deployment with a dynamic model

    Yujiro Kawasaki, Shigeki Hagihara, Jun'ichi Miki

    JSIAM conference for March 2021  2021.03  -  2021.03 

  • Prospects for Matching Theory: Introduction to Existing Key Results and Current Status of Recent Research

    Yujiro Kawasaki  [Invited]

    2018.09  -  2018.09 

  • Strategy-proof Matching with Regional Minimum Quotas

    Masahiro Goto, Naoyuki Hashimoto, Atsushi Iwasaki, Yujiro Kawasaki, Suguru Ueda, Yosuke Yasuda, Makoto Yokoo

    Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2014  2014.05  -  2014.05 

  • Optimal False-name-proof Single-Item Redistribution Mechanisms

    Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yujiro Kawasaki, Mingyu Guo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo

    Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2014  2014.05  -  2014.05 

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research

  • Analysis of matching under uncertain information: for broader application of mechanisms

    Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists

    Project Year: 2019.04  -  2022.03 

  • Mathematical analysis and proposal on constrained matching formation problems

    Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists(B)

    Project Year: 2014.04  -  2017.03 

    We study distributional and informational constraints on matching formation. As for distributional constraint, we examine maximum and minimum quotas are imposed not only on individuals but also on regions and provide a new notion of second-best stable matching and a mechanism which always produce it because the well-known stable matching does not always exist in this case. As for informational constraints, we analyze the effect of information asymmetry in a decentralized matching market and propose a new type of matching mechanism that does not require each individual's full length of preference ordering over candidates.

  • Establishing Theory of Resource Allocation Mechanism Design for Sustainable Development

    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research(S)

    Project Year: 2012.05  -  2017.03 

    How to allocate precious resources becomes critical due to various pressing social issues, including energy, environmental, and aging population issues. The goal of this project is developing the theory of resource allocation mechanism design, which aims to make desirable decisions considering economic, social, and environmental needs when multiple agents exist, by synthesizing/extending technologies from computer science and micro economics. More specifically, we developed design, analytic, and representation technologies for resource allocation. In particular, we made notable contributions on mechanism design for constrained two-sided matching, equilibrium analysis for repeated games in noisy environments, and concise and efficient representations for coalitional games. The summary of publications of this project is as follows: refereed international conferences 87, international journals 74, domestic journals 11, research monographs 8, textbooks 4, invited talks 40.